INTRODUCTION
The Indiana Supreme Court promulgates the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure ("Appellate Rules" or "Rules"), and Indiana's appellate courts-the Indiana Supreme Court ("Supreme Court"), the Indiana Court of Appeals ("Court of Appeals"), and the Indiana Tax Court-interpret and apply the Rules. This Article summarizes amendments to the Rules, analyzes cases interpreting the Rules, and highlights potential pitfalls appellate practitioners should avoid. This Article does not cover every case interpreting the Rules occurred during the survey period. Instead, it focuses on the most significant, recent decisions. First, an attorney must certify his or her contact information in the Indiana Supreme Court Roll of Attorneys is accurate "as of the date of the Notice of Appeal." Second, an attorney must acknowledge that "all orders, opinions, and 4 notices in the matter will be sent to the email" address on the Roll of Attorneys." 5 And finally, an attorney must " [a] cknowledg [e] that each attorney listed on the Notice of Appeal is solely responsible for keeping his/her Roll of Attorneys contact information accurate." 6 The Indiana Supreme Court also amended Rule 16(B), Appearances, to require appellees to certify their contact information, to acknowledge all orders will be sent by email, and to acknowledge the attorney is responsible for keeping 2. See Order Amending Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure, No. 94S00-1501-MS-22 (Ind. Jan. 16, 2015) , available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/order-rules-2015-0116-appellate.pdf [https://perma.cc/4EDU-45F9].
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The supreme court added a new subsection to Rule 23(C), requiring an original and one copy of an Indiana Administrative Rule 9(G)(5) notice to be filed with the Supreme Court Clerk: "Administrative Rule 9(G)(5) Notices. An original and one (1) copy of any Notice that must be filed per Administrative Rule 9(G)(5)." Administrative Rule 9(G)(5) provides the procedure for 11 excluding court records from public access.
12
The supreme court also corrected an error contained in the Appellate Rule 9-1 Form (Notice of Appeal). Appellate Rule 14(C) provides the Indiana Court of Appeals has the discretion to accept an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or denying class action certification. Despite this, the Appellate Rule A "party's forfeiture" of the right to appeal does not "mean the appellate courts somehow lose their authority to hear and determine the general class of cases to which a party's case belongs or over the party attempting to assert its right of appeal." "Timely filing relates to neither the merits of the controversy nor to the 27 competence of the courts on appeal to resolve the controversy. it also noted even if the Post-Conviction Rules did not permit Strong to bring his appeal, "In re Adoption of O.R. would offer him an opportunity to demonstrate 'extraordinary compelling reasons' justifying the filing of a belated notice of appeal." "The trial court, in twice granting Strong's motions to file a belated 37 notice of appeal, must have found compelling reasons to do so, and we give substantial deference to its decision." Therefore, the court of appeals held that 38 "the trial court's decision to grant Strong permission to file a belated notice of appeal was not an abuse of discretion."
39
In In re E.W., the trial court entered an order "that all contact between Mother and Child cease" until the child became an adult. Similarly, the Indiana Supreme Court emphasized appeals should be heard on the merits. In Hollowell v. State, a pro se petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Appellate Rules 9(F)(10) and 24(A)(1) 43 required Hollowell to file his notice of appeal with the appellate court clerk and "serve copies of the Notice on the trial court clerk, the court reporter, and the parties." Although the trial court clerk received a copy of the notice, neither the 44 court reporter nor the trial court did. In addition, under Appellate Rule 40(A)(2), 45 Hollowell sought permission to proceed in forma pauperis, and if the motion had been granted, it "would have afforded Hollowell a copy of the post-conviction transcript at public expense." The appellate court docket reflected that the 46 motion to proceed in forma pauperis was pending at the trial court, but "it [did] not appear from the record that the trial court clerk ever received or filed such a motion. In addition, the trial court clerk did not immediately notify the court reporter that a transcript had been requested."
47
The court reporter and trial court judge then "filed with the Court of Appeals a document titled 'Court Reporter's Emergency Verified Motion for Extension of Time to File Transcript.'" The motion reflected no arrangement had yet to be 48 made for payment for the transcript, apparently because the trial court had either not received Hollowell's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, or if the trial court had received it, the trial court had not ruled on it. "In response to the emergency 49 motion, the Court of Appeals issued an order declaring that the court reporter had no obligation to prepare the transcript unless she received further direction from the Court of Appeals." The order also required Hollowell to show cause why his 50 appeal should not be dismissed.
51
Hollowell responded that "he had followed the rules of appellate procedure." "Acknowledging Hollowell's response 
B. Trial Court Jurisdiction
In LBLHA, LLC v. Town of Long Beach, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment, and on December 26, 2013, the trial court entered summary judgment to the defendants on four counts of the complaint. After a motion to motion was deemed denied on July 6, 2014. After the motion to correct error 66 was deemed denied, the trial court set the matter for a hearing on August 21, but the trial court clerk filed its notice of completion of the clerk's record on August 6. Nevertheless, the trial court held the hearing on August 21. 
D. Interlocutory Appeals
In Decker v. State, the trial court determined probable cause existed for Decker's arrest, but it did not address the admissibility of the evidence. The The court of appeals began its analysis by noting:
Ind. Appellate Rule 14(B) governs discretionary interlocutory appeals. "An appeal may be taken from . . . interlocutory orders if the trial court certifies its order and the Court of Appeals accepts jurisdiction over the appeal." "The rule provides for a two-step process to initiate a discretionary interlocutory appeal: first the trial court must certify its order for interlocutory appeal; then, if the trial court does so, this court The court of appeals noted interlocutory appeals are appropriate if the "appellant will suffer substantial expense, damage or injury if the order is erroneous and the determination of the error is withheld until after judgment." In addition, 81 interlocutory appeals may be taken if the "order involves a substantial question of law, the early determination of which will promote a more orderly disposition of the case," or if the "remedy by appeal is otherwise inadequate." The court of 82 appeals concluded because the issue of suppression of the evidence had been fully briefed, it was appropriate for the court to take jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal. [T]his Rule is not "designed to create an appeal as of right from every order to produce documents during discovery." Nevertheless the Rule does involve court orders "which carry financial and legal consequences akin to those more typically found in final judgments: payment of money, issuance of a debt, delivery of securities, and so on."
90
Ball State argued this rule applied because "it has a common law lien over Daughter's transcript and may not be compelled to release the transcript absent payment of the unpaid tuition balance." The supreme court concluded Ball State 91 had "a common law lien" and "common law liens are much like securities. And the trial court's order directing Ball State to release the transcript to daughter thereby forfeiting its liens carries 'financial and legal consequences akin to those more typically found in final judgments.'" Therefore, the supreme court (1)(c)(i) The court then noted that "the only subdivision of Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A) that is arguably applicable in this appeal is subsection '(1) For the payment of money [.] '" Orders that fall within Rule 14(A)(1) include "orders which carry 107 financial and legal consequences akin to those more typically found in final judgments," such as " [o] rders to pay death taxes," "orders to pay attorney's fees," "orders to pay child support," "orders to make a deposit of money into court," and "orders for the payment of attorney's fees as a sanction." Because the trial 108 court's order "did not directly order one of the parties to pay a sum to another 
